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PRIVACY AND CONTRACEPTION IN THE
AMERICAN AND IRISH CONSTITUTIONS
ROBERT A. BURT*
To an American constitutional lawyer, McGee v. Attorney Gen-
eraP is the most intriguing of the Irish Supreme Court cases that Ge-
rard Whyte has discussed. The initial fascination of the case comes
from its obvious kinship with the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Griswold v. Connecticut.2 Both decisions overturned laws that
prohibited use or availability of contraceptives by married couples.3
Both decisions, moreover, were based on a constitutional right to pri-
vacy that was not explicitly recognized in the text of either the Irish or
the United States Constitutions. Indeed, two of the Irish Justices drew
direct support for finding a privacy right in the Irish Constitution from
the American interpretation of the United States Constitution in
Griswold.4
Notwithstanding these doctrinal similarities, however, there are
substantial differences between McGee and Griswold, and I find these
differences even more interesting than the similarities. The differences
between the two cases arise from the contrasting political context and
social significance of the anti-contraception statutes in the United
States and Ireland.
The first clue to the contextual differences is the fact that the Con-
necticut statute at issue in Griswold was enacted in 1879 while the
McGee statute was passed in 1935. Accordingly, when the two courts
considered the constitutional question, in 1965 and 1974 respectively,
the Connecticut prohibition was a less direct contemporaneous expres-
sion of public opinion than the Irish act. Moreover, and even more sig-
nificantly, contraceptives were in fact widely and even openly available
in Connecticut notwithstanding the statute. Indeed, four years before
Griswold, the United States Supreme Court had dismissed a constitu-
tional challenge to the Connecticut act on the ground that the statute
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
I. 1974 I.R. 284.
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. The Connecticut statute directly forbade contraceptive use, 381 U.S. at 480,
while the Irish act prohibited access by proscribing sale or importation of contracep-
tives, 1974 I.R. at 285-86.
4. 1974 I.R. at 326-28 (Henchy, J.); 1974 I.R. at 335-36 (Griffin, J.).
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was, as a practical matter, virtually never enforced.t; Following this dis-
missal, the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut opened a birth
control clinic explicitly dedicated to dispensing contraceptives; the state
prosecution followed from this intentional public provocation.
As this enforcement background made clear, the central practical
question under the Connecticut act was whether openly publicized clin-
ics could be established to promote the use of contraceptives. The stat-
ute did not significantly obstruct the availability or use of contracep-
tives by married or unmarried couples in the state. By contrast, the
Irish anti-contraceptive statute was pervasively effective. When McGee
was decided in 1974, it was difficult for anyone in Ireland to obtain
contraceptive devices of any kind.
Beyond these contrasting enforcement patterns between the Con-
necticut and Irish statutes, there was another even more important dif-
ference in the character of the two jurisdictions. In Ireland, Catholics
constituted some ninety-three percent of the population. Catholics were
not so overwhelmingly represented in Connecticut but they were a sub-
stantial proportion of the state-forty-five percent of its population in
1965, when Griswold was decided. Connecticut was, however, almost
unique among the American states in this regard; only two other states
had a larger proportion of Catholics-Connecticut's adjacent neighbors
of Rhode Island (sixty-two percent Catholic) and Massachusetts (fifty-
three percent Catholic). By comparison, Catholics constituted only
twenty-four percent of the entire population of the United States in
1964.6
The impetus in 1879 for enactment of the Connecticut anti-contra-
ceptive use statute had not come from Catholics as such but was rather
part of a national campaign against sexual "libertinism" through the
imposition of state restrictions on adultery, fornication and prostitution,
as well as abortions and contraceptive use.7 By 1965, the political and
social significance of the Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute had
changed. By that time Connecticut was the only state that retained the
prohibition on contraceptive use (though a few others, such as Massa-
chusetts, still prohibited general public sale of contraceptives),8 and ef-
forts in the Connecticut state legislature to repeal the statute were ef-
fectively blocked by the opposition of the Catholic Church to artificial
means of birth control.
Whatever the strength or the sources for support of the anti-con-
5. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
6. THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY. 1965 GENERAL SUMMARY (1965).
7. See S. ROTHMAN. WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE: A HISTORY OF CHANGING IDEALS
AND PRACTICES. 1870 TO THE PRESENT 82-83 (1978).
8. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). A similar statute was in force in
New York, see Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 676 (1977); New York also had
a substantial Catholic representation, constituting 37 % of its population in 1965.
CATHOLIC DIRECTORY, supra note 6.
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traception statute in Connecticut, it was clear when the Supreme Court
decided Griswold that such a measure had very little popular support
in the United States generally. Justice Stewart's depiction of the Con-
necticut statute, in his dissenting opinion in Griswold, as an "uncom-
monly silly law" and even (at least implicitly) as "asinine,"9 reflected
the widespread view that this law was contrary to the dominant popular
assumptions in American society at the time. The specific result in
Griswold is overwhelmingly approved in the United States today. Even
the non-textual method of constitutional interpretation on which the
decision was based has become quite popular, as Judge Robert H. Bork
learned to his dismay in his confirmation hearings.
In Ireland today, by contrast, I would venture that no judge or
political leader would publicly describe the law overturned in McGee as
"silly" or "asinine." The popular Irish response to the McGee decision
itself was, moreover, much more negative than the American response
to Griswold. Though the Irish Parliament did grudgingly enact legisla-
tion five years after McGee regarding importation and distribution of
contraceptives,IO popular reaction against the decision was powerfully
revealed in the referendum approval of the pro-life amendment to the
Irish Constitution in 1983.11
The principal public argument favoring this amendment was that
the American pro-abortion decision in Roe v. Wade had been based on
Griswold, and the Irish decision in McGee had been based on Gris-
wold; therefore, the Irish Supreme Court could not be trusted to up-
hold legislation protecting fetal life. This argument disregarded the ex-
plicit contrary assurances of several Justices in McGee.12 The
constitutional amendment was clearly intended as a preemptive strike
against the apparent judicial liberalism revealed in McGee.13 In
America, as Bork's rejection makes clear, Griswold is generally viewed
as a beneficial decision even if its application in Roe v. Wade is more
controversial. In Ireland, however, McGee itself is widely regarded as
intrinsically dangerous.
This sharp divergence in popular reaction to the respective judicial
decisions points to further differences between McGee and Griswold.
At first glance, the Irish and Connecticut laws appear to present the
9. 381 U.s. at 527.
10. See Hogan, Law and Religion: Church-State Relations in Ireland From In-
dependence to the Present Day, 35 AM. J. COMPo L. 47, 69 (1987).
11. Id. at 75-77,82-83.
12. See the observations of Walsh, J., 1974 I.R. at 312, and Griffin, J., 1974 I.R.
at 325.
13. As Gerard Whyte observes, the more recent Irish referendum overwhelm-
ingly defeating a proposal for even limited availability of divorce is further evidence of
popular reaction against the underlying liberal assumptions of the Irish high court's
decision in McGee. Whyte, The Family and the State-Irish Constitutional Law, 7 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 237, 251 (1988).
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same issue of principle-whether a legislative majority could impose its
sexual morality derived from its theological beliefs on an unwilling and
unbelieving minority. However, the framework for considering this is-
sue of principle had a markedly different appearance in the supreme
courts of Ireland and the United States. The Connecticut legislation
overrode minority views in that state. Nonetheless, this one state, with
its substantial Catholic population, was a distinct minority in the entire
United States. If the United States Supreme Court was intent on pro-
tecting a vulnerable minority against a historically hostile majority, it
was not clear which minority-the Catholics clustered in Connecticut
or the contraceptive users in that state-was more deserving. Indeed,
the very uniqueness of the Connecticut law in the United States sug-
gested that it was an expression of cultural pluralism that might de-
serve constitutional protection as such. Moreover, even if the state law
were simply characterized as a majority acting against a minority, the
fact that public proselytizing rather than private use or even general
availability of contraceptives was the practical enforcement target of
the Connecticut law itself suggested that a rough accommodation had
been reached between protecting the moral sensibilities of devout
Catholics in Connecticut and safeguarding nonbelievers against direct
impositions to control their sexual conduct or childbearing choices.1"
Whatever the weight of these rationales for an American judge in
considering the constitutionality of the Connecticut statutes, none of
them even plausibly applies in Ireland. The Irish statute could not pos-
sibly be justified as an expression of minority views in a fundamentally
unsympathetic nation or, in practical terms, as a rough accommodation
between a majority's claim to regulate conduct in public forums and a
minority's claim to freedom in intimate matters of sexual practice. The
Irish statute was unambiguously an imposition of majority wishes on a
dissenting minority and equally impinged on public and private
behavior.
The apparent similarity of the rationales offered by the American
and Irish courts thus masks an important difference. The explicit ra-
tionale itself-that the anti-contraception statutes violated "fundamen-
tal values" rooted in the traditions of each country-had a more con-
vincing empirical foundation in the United States than in Ireland. If it
were not so clear, however, that the statute violated the deep-rooted
traditions and current moral beliefs of the people of Ireland, there was
another and quite different reason for invalidating the statute in the
Irish Constitution.
This reason arises from a provision in the Irish Constitution that
appears extraordinary and even virtually without precedent, at least to
an American constitutional lawyer. The provision is article 2, defining
14. See Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 392-93
(1979).
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the Irish nation to which the Constitution applies: "The national terri-
tory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territo-
rial seas."111 This provision thus disregards-indeed, it was intended to
repudiate-the political boundaries between the Irish Republic and
Northern Ireland that had been drawn by the 1925 treaty with Great
Britain recognizing Irish independence.I6
Article 2 was apparently meant to have aspirational more than im-
mediate practical implications. Article 3 of the Constitution adds the
qualification that, "pending the reintegration of the national territory,"
governmental acts shall apply in the Irish Republic within the treaty
boundaries.I7 This qualification does not resolve the critical question for
the judiciary in interpreting the rights conferred by the Constitution.
In one sense, article 2 might appear irrelevant for judges. If that
article were taken literally, an Ireland comprising the "whole island"
would have a population with a substantial Protestant minority, some
twenty-five percent of the total. Even if judges were obliged by article 2
to assume this statistic as an accomplished fact, this would not in itself
necessarily demonstrate that the anti-contraception statute was more
oppressive simply because the non-Catholic minority was twenty-five
percent rather than seven percent of the population. If the constitu-
tional issue is conceived in essentially individualistic terms, majority
invasion of the rights of one person is as offensive as the oppression of
multitudes.
This is, however, not the only way to frame the issue. From an-
other perspective, article 2 may be a highly relevant guide for judicial
conduct. That article can be read as a constitutional directive that gov-
ernmental actions must be consistent with the fundamental aspiration
for ultimate union of Northern Ireland with the South. If this is the
meaning of article 2, more is at stake in the anti-contraception statute
than its interference with an individual's "right to marital privacy."
With such an interpretation of article 2, the close connection between
the statute and the teachings of the Catholic Church becomes relevant
for judicial evaluation of constitutionality.
The anti-contraception statute can be characterized, in the context
of Irish political life, as an instance when the dominant Catholic major-
ity imposed its theologically-based moral beliefs on a disbelieving and
perpetually vulnerable minority.IS The statute has both a practical and
a symbolic implication for the Protestants who are the current majority
in Northern Ireland and who would be transformed into a minority in a
15. IRELAND CONST. art. 2.
16. Hogan, supra note 10, at 48 n.3.
17. IRELAND CONST. art. 3.
18. See C. O'BRIEN, STATES OF IRELAND 125 (1972). See also Hogan, supra
note 10, at 52, 67.
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re-integrated Ireland.19 The statute signifies the Protestant vulnerabil-
ity in a united Ireland because it disregards the tenet of tolerance for
differing moral beliefs-the core value of liberal, pluralistic democracy.
The concept of tolerance may indeed be too mild to capture the prob-
lem raised by the anti-contraception statute in the Irish context. The
statute might more aptly be characterized as a denial of mutual respect
from Catholic to Protestant, and therefore as a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws.
Viewed from this perspective, there is a more direct parallel for
the McGee decision in American constitutional law than Griswold v.
Connecticut. That parallel is Brown v. Board of Education.20 The im-
mediate question in Brown was, of course, the constitutionality of racial
segregation laws. If a court narrowly focused attention on the individ-
ual rights apparently affected by racial segregation laws, the court
would see the inhibitions on individuals' "freedom of association" (in
this instance, that blacks were prohibited from freely associating with
whites). With this narrow focus, however, the Court would have missed
the larger and more dispositive implications of the racial segregation
laws.21
The context that gave meaning to Brown was the questions raised
but not adequately resolved by the American Civil War. This War ap-
parently answered two questions: that the North and South were part
of a unified nation notwithstanding the wishes of the white South to
withdraw from that nation; and that in this one nation, the black mi-
nority could not be enslaved. These answers were imposed by force of
arms; and precisely for this reason, I would say, the answers were not
accepted as the final disposition by anyone. In little more than a gener-
ation's time, blacks were effectively re-enslaved. The white South em-
braced a cultural definition of itself that exaggerated its differences
from the rest of the United States, perhaps even in more caricatured
form than before the Civil War; and so the question whether blacks
were free and whether the United States was one or two nations re-
mained formally answered (both by the War and by the resulting con-
stitutional amendments), but practically unresolved.
19. Compare William Butler Yeats' observation, as a member of the Irish Senate
in 1925: "If you show that this country, Southern Ireland, is going to be governed by
Catholic ideas alone, you will never get the North. You will create an impassable bar-
rier between South and North, and you will pass more and more Catholic laws ....
You will not get the North if you impose on the minority what the minority consider to
be oppressive legislation." See Hogan, supra note 10, at 47.
20. 347 U.S. 463 (1954).
21. This narrow focus lay beneath Herbert Wechsler's obtuse criticism of Brown
that, because "freedom of association" was the only value implicated, no "neutral prin-
ciple" could give priority to some blacks' wish to associate with whites over some
whites' wish to refuse association with blacks. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princi-
ples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959).
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In 1954, when the Supreme Court invalidated the racial segrega-
tion laws in Brown, "freedom of association" was not the core value at
stake. The Court acted on the aspiration for national unity expressed in
the Civil War amendments-and with the hope that this time the con-
flict between the hostile forces could be resolved without violence. It
was not clear in 1954 that this hope would be realized. During the
uncertain course of implementing Brown, there were many times when
this hope appeared futile. The aspiration in the Brown decision was for
unity based not simply on respect for law, which can imply coerced
unity, but unity based on respect for equality of individuals, which im-
plies tolerance, and even mutuality, that coercion cannot assure. In
Brown, the Court clearly depicted how the regime of racial segregation
and its underlying premises of racial subjugation were inconsistent with
this ideal of uncoerced unity. The Court in effect challenged the white
South and the rest of the country either to conform its conduct to this
aspired ideal or to admit that it had abandoned the aspiration.
The American racial segregation laws could not be understood ex-
cept as a response to our Civil War. Similarly the Irish anti-contracep-
tion statute must be read against the background of civil warfare be-
tween Catholic and Protestant in that country. In the Irish context, the
division between North and South means continued disadvantage of the
Catholic minority in the North, and even the oppression of this minor-
ity as they and their Southern co-religionists see it. Moreover, it ap-
pears, possible elimination of this division inspires fear among the
Northern Protestant majority of disadvantage and even oppression
based on retaliatory impulses. In the American context, the division
between North and South both before and after the Civil War had the
same implications, except that the boundaries for hostility were racial
rather than religious. The decision of the Irish Supreme Court in Mc-
Gee, though on a smaller scale and in a more subdued way, has the
same implications as Brown in the United States.
The ambivalent, and perhaps even hostile response, of the Irish
populace to McGee in their enactment of the pro-life constitutional
amendment and defeat of the divorce reform amendment also has di-
rect parallels in the American popular response to Brown at least in its
first decade.22 Popular resistance in Ireland, moreover, has a constitu-
tional significance that to an American lawyer at least seems quite odd.
Unlike the United State Constitution, the Irish Constitution is easy-I
would say even amazingly easy-to amend. An act must be passed by
an ordinary majority of both Houses of Parliament and then ratified by
an ordinary popular majority at a referendum.23 There is not even pro-
vision for any minimum time lapse between parliamentary and popular
referendum action or indeed between judicial decision construing the
22. See generally B. MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE (1964).
23. IRELAND CONST. arts. 46-47.
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Constitution and invocation or completion of the amendment process.
In recent years, two constitutional amendments have been enacted to
overrule constitutional interpretations of the Irish Supreme Court
within six weeks24 and eighteen weeks,215 respectively, of the judicial
decisions. While these specific constitutional amendments have ad-
dressed somewhat technical and relatively unimportant issues, the same
formal process is obviously available for amendments of great signifi-
cance. To an American, the unchecked speed of the amendatory pro-
cess seems antithetical to one basic rationale for a written constitution
as a bulwark against ill-considered action by momentary, impulsive
majorities.
Paradoxically, however, this very ease of the amendatory process
in the Irish Constitution may have salutary implications for judicial
conduct. This ease does ameliorate one problem that has obsessed
many American judges and even more American academic commenta-
tors-the problem that in finding "fundamental rights" beyond those
explicitly specified in the constitutional text, judges are likely to con-
fuse their merely idiosyncratic values with their cultural heritage. If
the Irish Supreme Court strays too far from common cultural under-
standing, this errant course can readily be corrected.28 Constitutional
interpretations by which Irish judges proclaim their understanding of
the highest ideals of the Irish culture are accordingly more like educa-
tive acts of moral leadership than authoritative impositions by unap-
proachable and infallible black-robed icons.
Education often takes time; however, it can require learners to
yield their comfortable prejudices and illusions which is a painful and
often mightily resisted process. For this reason, the easy rapidity of the
amendatory process in the Irish Constitution can too readily sabotage
the educative potential in constitutional adjudication; and this seems
regrettable to me. There may, nonetheless, be one element in the con-
text of Irish constitutional adjudication that serves as a powerful cor-
rective to this problem. Because of the overwhelming electoral domi-
nance of devout Catholics in the Irish Republic, the interests of the
24. On April 9, 1987, the Irish Supreme Court decided Crotty v. An Taoiseach,
1987 I.L.R.M. 400, constitutionally invalidating a treaty entered by the Government
with the other members of the European Economic Community; a constitutional
amendment overriding the decision was approved by popular referendum on May 25,
1987.
25. On February 8, 1984, the Irish Supreme Court decided In the Matter of
Article 26 of the Constitution and in the Matter of the Electoral [Amendment] Bill
1983, 1984 I.R. 268, invalidating a parliamentary act enfranchising British subjects
residing in Ireland; a constitutional amendment overturning this decision was approved
by popular referendum on June 16, 1984.
26. This practical reality might in itself encourage Irish judges toward boldness
in their constitutional interpretations; it might equally inspire timidity among judges
who do not enjoy being overruled.
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minority of Protestants or disbelievers are always vulnerable. If, how-
ever, Irish judges resolve to protect this minority against oppressive im-
positions, through the interpretation of constitutional rights, the judges
can enlist one powerful ally for this protective purpose. That ally is the
knowledge among Catholics in Ireland that by imposing on their mi-
nuscule resident minority, they are effectively undermining any possible
means of protecting their vulnerable co-religionists in the North. Such
impositions may indeed provoke the Northern Irish Protestants to retal-
iate against their Catholic minority.
This is the background knowledge on which Irish judges can rely
and implicitly invoke when they challenge the Irish populace to restrain
their electoral power as an act of respect--<>r, at the least, of toler-
ance-toward a vulnerable minority in their own midst. The vulnerabil-
ity of the Catholic minority in the North can itself serve as an educa-
tive instrument toward protecting an empathic identification with
minorities residing in the South, whether those minorities are portrayed
in terms of their religion, their apparently deviant sexual practices27 or
some other socially scorned attribute.28
In one sense, this kind of identification with the Catholic minority
in the North may seem too narrowly sectarian and too obviously linked
to the political goal of national integration-more crudely utilitarian
than truly moral in its import. If, moreover, this identification rests on
nothing more than a crude utilitarian foundation, this might suggest
that the Irish Supreme Court should gauge the intensity of its commit-
ment to a constitutional norm of tolerance based on its practical assess-
ment of the realistic likelihood of ultimate political integration between
South and North.29
But this view of moral reasoning and of the educative role of con-
stitutional adjudication is itself too crude. The sectarian identification
and political alliance of Catholics in the South and North provide prac-
tical hooks for engaging the popular conscience, for leading the popu-
lace toward the transcendence of narrow partisanship and sectarianism
and toward a more universally encompassing empathy for vulnerable
outcasts. Drawing this universal lesson from homely analogies was a
central purpose and technique of Christ's parables; both the purpose
and the technique also have a proper role in secular constitutional adju-
27. Compare Norris v. Attorney General, 1984 I.R. 37, where the Irish Supreme
Court failed to act on this premise in upholding, by a three-to-two vote, criminal penal-
ties for private consensual homosexual acts.
28. Compare O'B. v. S., 1984 I.R. 316, where the Irish Supreme Court failed to
act on this premise by dismissing a constitutional challenge to discrimination against
illegitimate children in laws governing intestacy.
29. For doubts about the practical attainability of national integration, and
about the depth of public support for this goal in the Irish Republic, see O'BRIEN,
supra note 18, at 296-98.
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dications.30 In the specific context of the current violent struggles in
Northern Ireland, sectarian prejudices may be too passionately in-
flamed and may therefore doom any realistic hope for the success of
moral leadership toward universalist goals. But even here, in these bit-
ter and apparently endlessly escalating conflicts, an object lesson re-
garding the destructiveness of narrow sectarian impulses can be drawn
by a skilled and courageous teacher.
If the Justices of the Irish Supreme Court interpret their constitu-
tional mandate toward the service of this moral educative goal, their
success is not assured. The very ease of popular amendment itself casts
doubt on their practical capacity. At the same time, however, this pat-
ent vulnerability can clarify for Irish judges what American judges too
easily overlook in the exercise of their constitutional authority: That
the protection of minorities against majority oppression in practice can-
not, and in principle should not, rest on coercion by judges against the
majority oppressors; that this protection takes firm hold only when the
majority understands that if it coerces a minority, it ultimately creates
nothing more than a shared state of oppression; and that judges
through constitutional interpretation must lead, but cannot force, the
majority toward this understanding.
30. For an exploration of this proposition, see Burt, Constitutional Law and the
Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L. J. 455 (1984). For consideration of a similar role
for constitutional adjudication in fostering fellow-feeling, see generally L. BOLLINGER,
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA
(1986). For an illuminating exposition of the analogy generally between a sacred text
and the United States Constitution, see S. LEVINSON. CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
